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ABSTRACT
When deploying wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in pub-
lic environments it may become necessary to secure their
data storage and transmission against possible attacks such
as node-compromise and eavesdropping. The nodes feature
only small computational and energy resources, thus requir-
ing efficient algorithms. As a solution for this problem the
TinyPEDS approach was proposed in [7], which utilizes the
Elliptic Curve ElGamal (EC-ElGamal) cryptosystem for ad-
ditive homomorphic encryption allowing concealed data ag-
gregation. This work presents an optimized implementation
of EC-ElGamal on a MicaZ mote, which is a typical sensor
node platform with 8-bit processor for WSNs. Compared to
the best previous result, our implementation is at least 44%
faster for fixed-point multiplication. Because most parts of
the algorithm are similar to standard Elliptic Curve algo-
rithms, the results may be reused in other realizations on
constrained devices as well.
Keywords
Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Resource Constrained Devices,
Wireless Sensor Networks
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are used to monitor cer-
tain phenomena in their environment. These phenomena
may be temperature in meteorological, vibrations in seis-
mic, or radioactivity in hazardous applications. However,
usually the employed devices are only equipped with lim-
ited resources in terms of energy, storage, and CPU power.
The resource consumption in a WSN is tied to the amount of
the data being processed, stored, and transmitted. There-
fore, it is necessary to reduce the amount of such data in
the network without loosing relevant information.
Depending on the way the data is collected and processed,
WSNs are grouped into synchronous and asynchronous. For-
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mer ones transmit the sensed data in real-time to a collector
device, while latter ones store the sensed data distributed in
the WSN and transmit it on demand. This work focuses
on asynchronous WSNs only. The device used for request-
ing and collecting data from the WSN is assumed to be a
mobile device such as a laptop, i.e. with relatively high
computational resources.
SinceWSNs are typically deployed in public and untrusted
environments, the data storage and transmissions must be
protected, which may be achieved using encryption tech-
niques. In asynchronous WSNs the sensed data needs to
be stored in the network until it is collected by the reader
device. Therefore, such networks have to provide the func-
tionality of a distributed database as well. The naive way
would be to store each data value individually and trans-
mit them when requested. However, this approach does not
scale well and collides with the low resource availability of
the nodes.
As a solution for these problems, the authors of [7] pro-
posed the tiny persistent encrypted data storage in asyn-
chronous WSNs (TinyPEDS). It incorporates an approach
to reduce the data amount by in-network data aggregation,
i.e. the data is stored in a condensed form. Within the
framework of TinyPEDS it is assumed that the use of tamper-
resistant hardware for the single nodes of the WSN is pro-
hibitively expensive. Therefore, the application of only sym-
metric encryption can not guarantee confidentiality, because
an attacker may be able to gain the key by examining a
node. Because of this, TinyPEDS proposes as a trade-off
between security and resource consumption the use of a hy-
brid approach, namely the combination of a symmetric and
a public key encryption, whose sensitive private key is not
present in the WSN. The symmetric scheme is used during
the data aggregation, while the asymmetric scheme is em-
ployed for long-term replicated data storage. However, to
facilitate confidential data aggregation, an additive homo-
morphic encryption is needed, for which the Elliptic Curve
ElGamal (EC-ElGamal) cryptosystem is used.
This work presents a highly efficient implementation on
MicaZ motes for the EC-ElGamal scheme, which is used to
realize the public key encryption part of TinyPEDS. Be-
cause the WSN nodes have to contain further functionality
apart from EC-ElGamal, the ECC implementation should
be realized with minimal code size. For the data memory
usage a similar motivation holds. In comparison to code and
memory size the execution time is not as critical. Therefore,
this work focuses on the optimization of code size, memory
usage, and computation time – in this order. In comparison
with other implementations from literature the proposed so-
lution demands less storage for code, consumes less memory
and offers faster operation. Only the solution presented in
[9] allows faster execution, however, at the expense of code
size. Note that the EC-ElGamal scheme shares many prop-
erties with other standard EC algorithms. Thus, the major
parts from this work are also applicable to other EC imple-
mentations on small general purpose processors.
The following section offers an overview of related work
and clarifies the contribution of this work. Section 3 presents
a more detailed description of the parts of TinyPEDS rele-
vant for this work. Section 4 discusses the design decisions
on the different abstraction levels. The results of the proto-
type implementation are introduced in Section 5, which also
offers some comparisons with other realizations. Section 6,
finally, concludes this paper with some closing remarks.
2. RELATED WORK
Elliptic Curve implementations for small processors may
be found in [9], [11], and [19]. The authors of [9] intro-
duced the utilization of modular arithmetic over GF(p) with
the pseudo-Mersenne prime reduction and the Hybrid mul-
tiplication. For further improvements they employed mixed
coordinates and the non-adjacent form (NAF) reducing the
number of needed point additions.
In [11] precomputation using the sliding window method
is proposed to speed up the point multiplication, although
no signed representation is used. The authors of [19], finally,
utilize all above methods including NAF and precomputa-
tion of points.
This work is based on these proposals by introducing the
Interleave method from [13] and substituting the NAF with
the mutual opposite form (MOF), see [15]. Employing pre-
computation of points the Interleave method allows the re-
duction of needed point doublings, while the MOF exhibits
smaller storage requirements. Finally, this work applies the
fast pseudo-Mersenne prime reduction not only to the mul-
tiplication, but to the addition as well.
3. TINYPEDS
TinyPEDS [7] is an approach for asynchronous WSNs,
which allows confidential, memory-efficient, and distributed
storage of sensed data on resource constrained devices. This
work concentrates on the efficient realization of the pub-
lic key security primitives in TinyPEDS, i.e. the concealed
data aggregation using the EC-ElGamal scheme. Thus, for
a better understanding of the following sections, this section
highlights these parts of TinyPEDS in more detail.
3.1 Concealed data aggregation
Because resource consumption – both energy and storage
capacity – is critical for the overall lifetime of WSNs, it is
necessary to employ techniques to minimize this consump-
tion. In-network data aggregation works toward this goal by
condensing the data stored and transmitted, while still pro-
viding the necessary amount of information. In TinyPEDS
this concentration is done by storing sums of sensed values,
which allows the calculation of the average. Figure 1 depicts
a simple example for in-network data aggregation, where the
sensed values are not encrypted.
However, to limit damage caused by possible attacks the
Figure 1: Data aggregation in WSNs
Figure 2: Concealed data aggregation in WSNs
data has to be encrypted. Then, the aggregator node A
should calculate the Sum = [Enc(15)+Enc(16)+Enc(18)+
Enc(14)] of the encrypted values. This scenario is depicted
in Figure 2.
In general, the decrypted sum of ciphertextsDec[Enc(15)+
Enc(16) +Enc(18) +Enc(14)] will not be equal to the sum
of the plaintexts (15 + 16 + 18 + 14). Thus, the encryption
scheme employed needs to support the following property.
Enc(a1 + a2 + . . .) = Enc(a1)⊕ Enc(a2)⊕ . . . ,
where Enc(a) denotes the encryption of a message a and
⊕ represents an addition performed on ciphertexts from a
public encryption scheme. An encryption scheme with this
property is called additive homomorphic.
In [14] several candidates for an asymmetric additive ho-
momorphic encryption schemes were studied. In their anal-
ysis, the authors observed that the EC-ElGamal encryption
scheme represents the most promising one due to its supe-
rior performance and small ciphertext size. Based on this,
we decided to use EC-ElGamal within the TinyPEDS frame-
work.
3.2 Elliptic Curve ElGamal encryption scheme
The original ElGamal encryption scheme, see [6], is not
additive homomorphic. However, the elliptic curve group
is an additive group, which can be used to get an additive
homomorphic scheme. Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 show
the methods for EC-ElGamal encryption and decryption,
respectively. Therein, E is an elliptic curve over the finite
field GF(p). The order of the curve E is denoted n = #E
and G is the generator point of the curve E. The secret key
is defined as integer number x ∈ GF(p), while the public key
is determined as Y = xG.
The function map() is a deterministic mapping function
used to map values mi ∈ GF(p) to curve points Mi ∈ E such
Algorithm 1 EC-ElGamal encryption
Require: public key Y , plaintext m
Ensure: ciphertext (R,S)
1: choose random k ∈ [1, n− 1]
2: M := map(m)
3: R := kG
4: S := M + kY
5: return (R,S)
Algorithm 2 EC-ElGamal decryption
Require: secret key x, ciphertext (R,S)
Ensure: plaintext m
1: M := −xR+ S
2: m := rmap(M)
3: return m
that
map(m1 +m2 + . . .) = map(m1)| {z }
M1
+map(m2)| {z }
M2
+ . . .
holds. This is necessary, because the addition over an ellip-
tic curve is only possible with points on that curve, thus,
integers have to be mapped to corresponding points. For
this purpose, each integer m is mapped to a curve point M ,
where M is the m-multiple of the generator point G, i.e.
M = mG. The reverse mapping function rmap() extracts
m from a given point mG. The mapping function
map : m→ mG with m ∈ GF(p)
exhibits the additive homomorphic property, because
M1 +M2 + . . . = map(m1 +m2 + . . .)
= (m1 +m2 + . . .)G
= m1G+m2G+ . . .
holds, where m1,m2, · · · ∈ GF(p).
The mapping function is not security relevant, i.e. it nei-
ther increases nor decreases the security of the EC-ElGamal
encryption scheme. Note that the reverse mapping function
is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm problem over
an elliptic curve, which represents a computational draw-
back of this scheme. The reader device must solve rmap()
using a brute force approach, because it does not know the
sum of the sensed data values m beforehand. However,
rmap() is only performed on the powerful reader device and
the maximum length of the final aggregation is assumed to
be small enough in realistic WSNs (e.g., 3 byte) allowing a
successful brute force approach resulting in m, see [14].
4. DESIGN DECISIONS
Before starting the actual realization of the EC-ElGamal
system, several algorithms for its different parts have to be
decided on. Thus, the system was divided into four abstrac-
tion levels depicted in Figure 3. For each of the lower three
levels the employed algorithms are introduced in the follow-
ing.
4.1 Finite field level
This level contains operations like addition or multiplica-
tion within the finite field the elliptic curve is defined upon.
Additive Homomorphic
(Modular Multiplication, Modular Additon ...)
Application
Elliptic Curve
Elliptic Curve
Finite Field
Level
Group Level
Multiplication Level
Level EC−ElGamal
Point Multiplication
Point Addtion and Doubling
Modular Arithmetic
Multiplication Level
Figure 3: EC-ElGamal abstraction levels
Since all operations on higher levels are based on operations
on this level, it is critical for performance.
4.1.1 Underlying finite field
Elliptic curve cryptography is usually implemented either
over the prime field GF(p) or the binary field GF(2m). In [4]
the performance and memory requirements of several elliptic
curve algorithms over these fields are studied. The authors
found that the number of memory accesses and the code
sizes of realizations using binary fields is higher. Further-
more, binary field arithmetic, particularly multiplication, is
not well-supported by usual microprocessors, thus, it leads
to lower performance, see [9].
However, the inversion in GF(p) is computationally more
expensive than in GF(2m). In general, this can somewhat
be compensated by using a different coordinate system, in
which only one inversion is needed to compute the final re-
sult. In the context of TinyPEDS the decryption is only
executed on the reader device. Thus, by storing the inter-
mediate results in another coordinate system, the final in-
version may be executed on the computationally more pow-
erful reader device. Thus, we decided to use GF(p) in our
implementation.
4.1.2 Multi-precision multiplication
According to [9] 85% of the execution time of a typical
point multiplication is spent for multi-precision multiplica-
tions on resource constrained devices. Thus, the optimiza-
tion of the multi-precision multiplication is critical for the
overall performance.
Additionally to the well-known Schoolbook and Karat-
suba multiplication, see [12], [18] analyzed the Comba mul-
tiplication, see [8], and the Hybrid multiplication from [9].
The comparison of these approaches presented in [18] shows
that the Hybrid method is the most promising one, because
it combines the advantages of the Schoolbook and Comba
method and needs a small amount of registers and memory
accesses.
4.1.3 Modular reduction
After each multi-precision operation a modular reduction
is executed to guarantee that the result is in GF(p). The re-
duction methods analyzed are the well-known Montgomery
and Barrett reduction and the less general pseudo-Mersenne
prime reduction, as given in [12]. Although the latter method
is far more efficient, this comes at the cost of a special form
for possible primes p. However, because this does not limit
security, it is a good trade-off with respect to the low compu-
tational power of the target platform. A good introduction
to pseudo-Mersenne prime reduction can be found in [10].
A n-bit pseudo-Mersenne prime has the form p = 2n − c,
where n is the bit length and c the sum of few powers of 2
with c≪ 2n. The efficiency of the modular reduction stems
from the fact that
2n − c ≡ 0 mod p⇔ 2n ≡ c mod p
Thus, for the modular reduction, 2n can be substituted with
c, which is smaller than 2n and therefore results in a residue
class with smaller bit-length. Let a and b be n-bit integers
and r = a ·b their 2n-bit product, which may be represented
as
r = rh · 2
n + rl ≡ rh · c+ rl mod p (1)
where rh and rl denote the n most and least significant bits
of r, respectively. Since 2n is substituted with the much
smaller c, r strictly decreases for each substitution, see [12].
The reduction may be computed with only few iterations.
The complete algorithm for the reduction after the multipli-
cation may be found in [10].
4.1.4 Modular addition
The modular addition z = a+ b is executed in two steps.
In the first step the not-reduced intermediate result r = a+b
is computed. Traditionally, r is reduced in the second step
according to
z =

r − p if r ≥ p
r otherwise
By using the pseudo-Mersenne prime reduction instead
of the subtraction, the execution time and code size may
be decreased, which is of special interest in case of WSNs.
Thus, instead of subtracting p the constant c is added, if r ≥
p. The subtraction of 2n may be done implicitly by ignoring
the carry, which either is produced during the addition a+b
or the addition r + c.
Our investigations showed that the performance of modu-
lar addition using the pseudo-Mersenne reduction is nearly
twice as good as the usual approach based on subtraction.
This is because only the non-zero bytes of the c have to be
added. Furthermore, only the bytes, which actually need to
be changed, have to be read/written from/to memory.
4.2 Elliptic curve group level
This abstraction level provides operations to form an ad-
ditive group over the elliptic curve points. These opera-
tions are point addition, which adds two different points,
and point doubling, which adds a point to itself. The result
in both cases is again a point on the curve. For a thorough
introduction to ECC, see [3].
Elliptic curves may be represented in different coordinate
systems, which differ in storage requirements and computa-
tional effort for the algorithms of point addition and dou-
bling. A good overview on different coordinate systems is
offered in [5], which was used for the investigation in [18].
Affine, Projective, Jacobian, Chudnovsky-Jacobian, and
the Modified Jacobian coordinate systems were compared
in terms of performance and memory requirements. As a
further possibility [5] suggests the use of mixed coordinate
systems, i.e. input and output points are represented in dif-
ferent coordinate systems. The analysis in [18] showed that
this idea allows better results than all above coordinate sys-
tems considered separately. However, because TinyPEDS
exhibits different constraints, e.g. no finite field inversion
is needed, the examination in [18] leads to different results
than in [5].
According to [18] AJJ coordinates for point addition ex-
hibit the smallest storage requirements and computational
effort. In this notation, A and J denote the affine and Ja-
cobian coordinate system, respectively. Furthermore, AJJ
means for a point addition that the first input point is given
in affine coordinates, the second input point is given in Ja-
cobian coordinates, and the output point is computed in
Jacobian coordinates. For the point doubling, in turn, the
form JJ is suggested, which means that both input and
output points are represented in Jacobian coordinates.
4.3 Elliptic curve multiplication level
The main operation in elliptic curve cryptosystems is the
scalar or point multiplication. Although its efficiency de-
pends on the operations on the lower levels, the algorithm
on this level still has a high impact on overall execution time.
The optimization of the basic Double and Add algorithm de-
pends mainly on its direction. For further optimizations the
number of doublings may be reduced with the Interleave
method, while signed representations, in contrast, allow the
reduction of the number of point additions. Note that the
Interleave method and the general signed representations,
i.e. wMOF with w > 2, require precomputation of points,
which is only feasible for scalar multiplications with a fixed
base point G. If the base point changes for every point multi-
plication, precomputation results in a higher computational
overhead.
The double and add algorithm is the elliptic curve com-
plement to the square and multiply algorithm used for ex-
ponentiation, see [12]. Both Left-to-Right and Right-to-Left
directions are possible. According to [18] the Left-to-Right
method is superior due to lower storage requirements and
the fact, that the Right-to-Left method does not allow AJJ
point additions.
4.3.1 Reducing the number of point doublings
The Interleave method was originally proposed for multi-
scalar multiplications of the form (k1 ·P1+ k2 ·P2+ . . .), see
[13]. However, this idea can also be used to perform single
scalar multiplications. This is due to the fact that the scalar
multiplication kP of an n-bit scalar k with a curve point P
may also be represented as a sum of t partial multiplications
with t scalars ki and t points Pi as follows.
kP = (kt · 2
(t−1)n/t + ...+ k2 · 2
n/t + k1) · P (2)
=
tX
i=1
ki · Pi (3)
Thereby, each scalar ki is a n/t-bit long part of k and Pi =
2(i−1)n/tP . Note that n is padded with 0’s from left until it
is a multiple of t.
The Interleave method leads to a performance increase, if
the points Pi are precomputed and stored off-line, as shown
in Algorithm 3. Therein, ECADD and ECDBL refer to
the point addition and doubling, respectively.
4.3.2 Reducing the number of point additions
Because a point addition is only executed if the corre-
sponding bit of the scalar k is 1, a signed representation
which reduces the Hamming weight of k can be used to
reduce the number of point additions. [18] analyzed both
the non-adjacent form (NAF) and the mutual opposite form
(MOF), see [16] and [15], respectively. Although both lead
to the same Hamming weight, MOF is superior to NAF,
because it exhibits lower memory requirements.
Algorithm 3 Interleave method with precomputed points
Require: n-bit scalar k split into t parts ki with
n
t
bit each,
precomputed points Pi = 2
(i−1)n/tP for i ∈ [2, t], n is a
multiple of t
Ensure: scalar product R = kP
1: R := ∅
2: for j from (n
t
− 1) to 0 do
3: R := ECDBL(R)
4: for i from 1 to t do
5: if kij == 1 then {kij denotes the jth bit of ki}
6: R := ECADD(R,Pi)
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
10: return R
The Hamming weight of k represented in wMOF is 1/(1+
w) on average, where w is the bit width of the used bytes,
see [15]. Therefore, the amount of needed point additions is
reduced by 1+w. Moreover, because negative points −Q =
−(Q) = −(x, y) = (x,−y) do not have to be precomputed,
the amount of precomputed points for the wMOF method
is 2w−2 − 1. This leads to a total of
(t− 1) + t · (2w−2 − 1)
precomputed points, if both Interleave method and wMOF
are used.
5. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
For the prototype implementation a MicaZ mote, see [1],
was used, which is a typical device for WSNs and is equipped
with a 8-bit processor. The bit width of coordinates and
scalar k was chosen to be 160, thus the multi-precision inte-
gers need 20 bytes each. The realization employed TinyOS-
2.0, an open-source operating system designed for WSNs,
see [2]. The prototype was implemented with nesC V1.2.8a
and compiled using gcc V3.4.3 for the AVR processor using
the default compiler options specified in TinyOS-2.0 make
system. The operations on the lowest abstraction level were
realized using Assembler, while those on higher levels were
written in nesC. The timing results form the prototype are
the average over 500 executions with random numbers and
were generated using the curve parameters secp160r1 from
[17].
The performance of different point multiplications is shown
in Table 1, which also presents performance values for so-
lutions from literature. The upper part contains multipli-
cations without precomputed points, while the lower part
those with precomputation. The point multiplication in the
first row was executed with the simple Left-to-Right binary
method, while 2MOF was employed for the second row. The
point multiplications in the lower part of Table 1 from this
work employed the Interleave method.
Note that the performance values for TinyECC-0.2 in Ta-
ble 1 were obtained by integrating it into the test suite
from this work, because the values were not presented in
[11]. Furthermore, this work does not contain the conver-
sion back to affine coordinates including the expensive mod-
ular inversion, because it is executed on the reader device
in TinyPEDS. According to [5], the ratio between modu-
lar multiplications and inversions Inv/Mult is 30. Thus,
Table 1: Comparison of point multiplications
Reference
#Prec. Exec. Code size Memory
points time [bytes] size [bytes]
This work 0 1.23s 2096 180
This work (2MOF) 0 1.03s 2794 260
[9] 0 0.81s 3682 282
[19] 0 1.35s n/a n/a
[11] 0 1.78s 6562 382
This work 1 0.69s 3166 481
This work 2 0.57s 3536 543
[19] 15 1.24s n/a n/a
Table 2: Implementation results for EC-ElGamal
#Precomputed Execution Code size Memory
points time [bytes] size [bytes]
0 2.48s 2726 320
0 (2MOF) 2.16s 3172 400
2 1.42s 3806 621
4 1.19s 5122 683
together with the additional four modular multiplications
needed for the conversion, this results in 34 · 0.532ms =
18ms, where 0.532ms is the execution time of one modular
multiplication, see [18]. Therefore, for a fair comparison,
this value is already added to the results in Table 1.
Table 2, finally, shows the performance of different real-
izations of the EC-ElGamal, which contains each two point
multiplications with an n-bit scalar k and one short point
multiplication with the sensed data m, see Algorithm 1.
Note that for test purposes m is chosen to be 8-bit.
5.1 Assessment of non-precomputation
For the comparison with the point multiplication from
[9], we used our solution from the second row of Table 1,
because both use a signed representation. Our solution is
about 21% slower, but its code size is about 24% smaller.
For this we have several possible explanations. Firstly, we
applied loop unrolling only to loops most critical for exe-
cution time in order to keep the code size small. However,
we believe that the authors of [9] employed loop unrolling
for every loop in the finite field and elliptic curve operations.
Secondly, to reduce code-size, we executed modular squaring
with multiplications, rather than using a dedicated squar-
ing operation. Thirdly, the solution from [9] was completely
implemented in Assembler, while we did this only for the fi-
nite field operations and wrote the elliptic curve operations
in nesC. Therefore, we believe that the performance of our
elliptic curve operations may be further improved by imple-
menting them in Assembler. Finally, our realization uses
TinyOS, which probably consumes additional CPU cycles.
Compared with the solution from [11], which is also exe-
cuted on a MicaZ mote, our implementation is 42% faster
and its code size is 57% smaller. The performance gains of
our solution presumably stem from more optimized modular
operations and the use of the 2MOF representation enabling
a faster point multiplication.
Compared with the solution from [19], finally, our imple-
mentation performs 23% faster. The authors did not present
figures about code and memory usage of their solution. How-
ever, because their implementation employed similar accel-
eration techniques as used in TinyECC-0.2 and the NAF
representation, we believe that our solution is superior to
[19] in terms of code size and memory consumption.
5.2 Assessment of precomputation
Although the implementation from [19] uses 15 precom-
puted points, it is significantly slower than both our solu-
tions employing only 1 and 2 precomputed points (see Ta-
ble 1). Our solution is 44% and 54% faster, when 1 and 2
precomputed points are used, respectively. Again, because
[19] employs similar acceleration techniques as TinyECC-
0.2, we believe that our realization is superior in terms of
code size as well.
In the design from [19] the number of the precomputed
points must be 2s − 1, where s is the window size. This
limits possible numbers of precomputed points, while the
Interleave method from our realization allows an arbitrary
amount with 2MOF representation. Furthermore, in our
case the Interleave method yields a higher benefit per pre-
computed point, because it divides the number of point dou-
blings by t, while the precomputation method from [19] re-
duces the – usually smaller – number of point additions to
(1/s) ·(1−1/2s). Therefore, our solution gains a higher ben-
efit from the same memory usage increase than the solution
from [19].
6. CONCLUSION
We presented an optimized realization of an elliptic curve
based additive homomorphic encryption to be used in the
TinyPEDS framework in WSNs. The main optimization
techniques employed are pseudo-Mersenne prime reduction
on the finite field level and the Interleave method and the
signed MOF representation for the point multiplication. Our
implementation offers a fast point multiplication, while fea-
turing small code and memory requirements. Finally, al-
though it was designed for the TinyPEDS framework, it may
be also used for more general elliptic curve implementations.
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